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Based on M&As from over 45 countries from 2003-2014, we show that the presence of end-
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Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) are major corporate events that affect both target and 
bidder shareholders’ wealth (Loughran, and Vijh, 1997; Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford, 2001; 
Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz, 2005; Capron and Shen, 2007; Bena and Li, 2014). M&A 
deals not only have real economic consequences, they are also of particular importance to 
managers. Successful M&A deals hinge on future employment prospects of managers (Harford 
and Schonlau, 2013; Mira, Goergen, and O'Sullivan, 2018) and determine their bonuses 
(Grinstein and Hribar, 2004).  
Managers are in the centre of the decision-making, yet their ethical standards might be 
often compromised by the pressures of the deal making (Aarsland et al., 2009). Therefore, 
managers can have strong incentives to manipulate stock prices in anticipation of an 
acquisition. They can engage in activities that change a firm’s fundamentals and inflate stock 
prices, such as earnings management or stock splits (Erickson and Wang, 1999; Louis, 2004; 
and Guo, Liu, and Song, 2008; Anagnostopoulou and Tsekrekos, 2015). These types of 
manipulations can be performed internally, but managers can also manipulate stock through 
external market participants (Aitken et al., 2015c; Yuan et al., 2009). They may deliberately 
interfere with the market around the time of an acquisition in order to affect the stock price of 
the target or acquirer firm.  
As an example, consider Maurice R. Greenberg, the Chairman of American 
International Group, who attempted to manipulate its stock in relation to its 2001 acquisition 
of American General. Greenberg contacted Richard Grasso, the head of the New York Stock 
Exchange, “in an effort to have Grasso prod the specialist firm responsible for trading AIG’s 
stock on the floor of the NYSE to prop up AIG’s stock price.”2 This raised inquiries at the 




Securities and Exchange Commission and the federal courts as to whether Greenberg tried to 
manipulate the stock price in order to reduce the acquisition costs.  
Market manipulation of target or acquirer stock prices is a previously unstudied channel 
that helps deceive the opposing deal party and investors. The theory of market manipulation 
suggests that traders can affect prices through price-destabilizing speculation (Jarrow, 1992). 
Stock market manipulation, typically, benefits manipulators at the expense of the firm and other 
investors. It can weaken a firm primarily through damage to its shareholders, by making the 
firm as an investment less desirable and hence making it harder for the company to raise capital 
in the future.  
The manipulation of EOD stock price can occur to the acquirer stock price or the target 
stock price. The acquirer firm may try to manipulate its stock in order to save on acquisition 
costs, while the target firm may manipulate its stock in order to boosts its valuation before an 
anticipated acquisition. However, if the acquirer or target firm notice unusual stock price 
movements and suspect manipulation, one or the other might call off the deal.  
This gives rise to three research questions that we explore in this paper: 1) Does market 
manipulation make the withdrawal of announced mergers more or less likely? 2) is the 
premium paid for a target higher or lower for stocks that have been manipulated? and 3) does 
regulation pertaining to market manipulation strengthen or weaken its effect on merger 
withdrawals and premiums?  
We focus on a specific type of manipulation here: the dislocation of “closing”’ or “end-
of-day” (EOD) firm prices. The effects of such manipulations have significant consequences 
because of the widespread use of closing prices (Comerton-Forde and Putniņš, 2011). EOD 
prices are particularly important because they are used to set deal prices in M&As, determine 
how options compensation is tied to equity prices, and determine the compensation of the key 
insiders of merging firms. As such, there is a massive incentive to manipulate the EOD prices 
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by ramping up EOD trading, thereby pushing closing prices to artificially high levels in 
advance of an M&A deal. A successful EOD distortion may facilitate a merger, however, EOD 
price manipulation can also lower long-term equity values, decrease liquidity, and ultimately 
make share prices less informative. All of these results could exacerbate the likelihood of an 
M&A deal withdrawal.  
In this paper, we offer novel evidence that uses the data on EOD price manipulation. 
This type of data is typically not publicly available, or, if it is, there is little information 
available for many countries (Comerton-Forde and Putniņš, 2011). Our measure of EOD stock 
price manipulation is used widely by over fifty securities surveillance authorities around the 
world through SMARTS, Inc., a software provider that was purchased recently by NASDAQ.  
An EOD stock price movement is considered dislocated if it has been four standard 
deviations away from its mean price change during the past 100-trading day benchmarking 
period at the end of the trading day, and then reverts back to the mean price the subsequent 
morning (further computational details are in the appendix). We do not examine manipulation 
of EOD prices on the actual announcement day, but instead over the thirty days prior to the 
M&A announcement date. Note that dislocation of the EOD price would not be a response to 
an M&A announcement or an expected M&A announcement for two important reasons: 1) the 
dislocated price reverts back to the prior level the next morning (while a price that jumps in 
response to an M&A announcement is likely to remain at that level for a sustained period until 
a merger announcement is confirmed not to be true), and 2) the dislocated price may be either 
positive or negative (in this paper, we assess both and find similar evidence for both). In section 
2, we provide a motivating illustrative example from a recently enforced case involving 




We study a sample of M&As of publicly traded target firms from 2003 to 2014 for 45 
countries. We find that, among 2,749 M&As, there were 135 cases (5%) where target closing 
prices were manipulated prior to the M&A deal announcement.3 Using a regression analysis 
and propensity score matching, we estimate the association between EOD target price 
manipulation and deal withdrawal. We find strong evidence that EOD market manipulation of 
target shares increases the probability of deal withdrawal, even after controlling for the 
possibility of overbidding and for whether the direction of the manipulation is positive or 
negative. Moreover, we find that the presence of EOD target price manipulation decreases the 
premium paid to the target firm. EOD price manipulation increases the probability of a deal 
withdrawal by approximately 12%, and lowers premiums by approximately 25%. The data 
indicates that more detailed exchange trading rules in countries associated with a reduction in 
the probability of M&A withdrawal, a reduction in the impact of EOD target price manipulation 
on deal withdrawal, and higher M&A premiums (consistent with Becker’s (1968) theory of 
crime).  
The economic impact of EOD target price manipulation is quite important. For the 135 
EOD cases where M&A deals were completed, there was a 25% decrease in premiums on 
average. This translates to U.S. $307 million in lost value, or a cumulative U.S. $41.45 billion 
in lost value. Therefore, targets that are subject to EOD price manipulation suffer significant 
losses.4 We find fewer cases of acquirer price manipulations (50, or 2% of the sample) prior to 
M&As. The evidence shows that these acquirer manipulations generally do not affect M&As 
significantly, except for positive acquirer price manipulations of share (not cash) transactions, 
which tend to increase the probability of deal withdrawal. 
                                                 
3 Based on evidence in Aitken et al. (2015a) we estimate that the stock price manipulation occurs on average in 
around 3.6% of firms, suggesting that the 5% probability of the target stock price manipulation before an M&A 
announcement is higher than for any other firm. 
4 Deal withdrawals also pose significant costs for the parties involved. For example, in 2016 alone, M&A advisers 




This paper contributes to several strands of the literature. First, we draw attention to a 
previously unstudied channel where the business ethics are compromised, i.e. the stock price 
manipulation by its insiders, and we discuss its economic effects in the context of M&A 
decisions. We, theoretically, develop potential motives that affect the ethical-decision conflict, 
and empirically test how the stock price manipulation affects the M&A deal withdrawal. Our 
findings suggest that EOD price manipulation affects M&A decisions, a topic that has not 
previously been considered in the literature. Second, we contribute to the related literature on 
the effects of litigation and illegal insider trading on M&As. For example, Krishnan et al. 
(2014) find that litigation action related to a deal affects the probability of deal completion and 
deal premium, conditional on whether the case filed in federal or state court. Meulbroek and 
Hart (1997) show that detected illegal insider trading adversely affects M&As and increases 
takeover premiums.  
Third, and more generally, we contribute to the literature on corporate governance and 
M&As (Masulis Wang, and Xie, 2007; Massa and Xu, 2013) by relating issues in 
microstructure and regulation to M&As. Fourth, we contribute to a related and more specific 
literature on intermediaries, M&As, and market manipulation. For example, Boone and 
Mulherin (2011) point out that private equity consortiums might facilitate collusion in the 
M&A market. They find that, in the short term, target returns are lower in private equity 
consortiums. However, over the long run, they find opposite results. Alperovych, Cumming, 
and Groh (2016) find evidence that private equity rumours (as defined in the BvD Zephyr 
dataset) harm M&A deals in terms of raising the probability of deal withdrawals and lowering 
premiums. Atanasov, Davies, and Merrick (2015) explore trade-based manipulation of closing 
prices, while Bernile, Sulaeman, and Wang (2015) suggest that, in certain circumstances, 
institutional investors might destabilize the price formation process. Our findings are consistent 
in terms of non-PE deals involving public acquisitions. We show that market manipulation 
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harms deal completion and lowers premiums, while regulations pertaining to it can mitigate 
these effects. 
Our paper has a number of important policy implications. Perhaps most notably, for 
regulators and surveillance authorities, the data indicates higher levels of EOD manipulation 
around failed mergers. Typically, the focus is on regulation and surveillance around completed 
mergers (see, e.g., Poser, 1986), but the analyses here indicate that failed mergers are often a 
result of manipulation, and hence warrant greater surveillance efforts. This is because the 
manipulation attempts could lead to hold-up problems in the M&A market, thereby disabling 
the efficient allocation of resources. Our results also suggest that, on average, there are scant 
benefits to insiders from manipulating stocks around the time of M&As, particularly in 
countries with effective market manipulation trading rules. Indeed, the harm to firms generally 
outweighs the possible benefits to insiders. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the intuition 
behind why market manipulation affects M&A transactions. We use a recent widely publicized 
case to illustrate how price manipulation around the time of a merger works in the real world; 
Section 3 describes our sample, while in section 4 we outline our research design. Section 5 
presents the descriptive statistics and univariate tests. Section 6 gives our results on the relation 
between market manipulation and the likelihood of M&A deal withdrawal. Section 7 
concludes.  
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
In this section, we discuss the theory and hypotheses about EOD stock price 
manipulation and M&As before presenting our data and empirical tests in subsequent sections. 
M&A deals are an important form of efficient capital reallocation. Yet, the significant 
information asymmetry can hold up many deals. Typically, both entities have access only to 
publicly available information about the other entity before announcing the M&A deal. The 
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amount of information they acquire before agreeing on the deal has critical impact on the 
estimation of the intrinsic value of the deal. The M&A agreement is a binding contract to purse 
the deal, yet it does not preclude the deal failure. If any of the initial agreed conditions are 
breached, the deal might be withdrawn. Much of the negotiation process is about agreeing on 
the purchase price.  
There is significant incentive to manipulate EOD stock prices in anticipation of M&A 
deals. The agreed transaction price and compensation to insiders is often based on recent posted 
EOD stock prices (Comerton-Forde and Putniņš, 2011).5 Typically, the stock prices can be 
manipulated through earnings management, yet the breach of ethical standards can go beyond 
manipulating the accounting numbers alone.  
Several corporate scandals unravel another way to set up the stock prices artificially. In 
particular, the managers or firm insiders can reach out and externally manipulate the firm’s 
stock price. Such unethical behaviour brings damage to organisations’ stakeholders and the 
economy. The ethical-decision making is particularly important in the context of M&As where 
the pressures for the decision maker are particularly strong. In line with Schwartz (2016) 
ethical-decision making theory, the ethical stance is a function of individual motives, time, and 
financial constraints. Ullah et al. (2018) propose that ethical-decision making is an interaction 
of various factors that involve “other organizational actors, processes and policies as well as 
the external context of the business”.  
Market manipulation can be motivated by several such factors, on either the target or 
the acquirer firm side. Stock market manipulation is typically an intentional action performed 
                                                 
5 For example, see the terms in the Eagle Bancorp and Virginia Heritage Bank Announced Merger, posted here  
https://globenewswire.com/news-release/2014/06/09/642813/10085123/en/Eagle-Bancorp-and-Virginia-
Heritage-Bank-Announce-Merger-Agreement.html. See also the terms of the Howard Bancorp and Patapsco 
Bancorp merger posted here http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20150303006036/en/Howard-Bancorp-
Patapsco-Bancorp-Merge-Howard-Receives. Both examples show that targets’ EOD prices in the recent period 
prior to the merger are used to set the M&A deal price. 
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by an informed trader. The decision to manipulate the stock price can take a form of either: 1) 
information-based manipulation where the informed trader affects the stock price directly 
without disclosing any information, i.e. a trade-based manipulation or 2) action-based 
manipulation where the trader takes actions in order to affect the stock price (Chakraborty and 
Yılmaz, 2004). Stock price manipulation is difficult to detect. Becker (1968) suggests that 
agents commit fraud only if the benefits exceed the cost of getting caught and punished. If the 
latter is lower than the benefits associated with manipulation, the manipulator will have strong 
incentives to engage in manipulative activities. We, thus, hypothesize that the firm’s insiders, 
i.e. managers or shareholders, may wish to engage in stock price manipulation as the benefit is 
higher than the loss.  
In the case of M&A transactions, the stock price manipulation affects the deal structure 
and its success or failure. Manipulation can either strengthen or weaken the deal. The stock 
price manipulation can be performed or initiated by either the firm insiders (such as officers 
and directors) and management, or non-insider shareholders.   
The M&A agreements can be cancelled due to variety of reasons that might include 
outbidding, negative market reaction (Luo, 2005), or problems discovered over the due 
diligence phase when both entities have access to private information. While the insiders’ 
incentives to complete the deal might be particularly strong, and might lead to unethical 
resolutions before the deal announcement, the discovery by either party of any irregularities 
after the announcement might lead to withdrawal or renegotiation. Thus, such uncertainty has 
enormous consequences for M&A outcomes (Officer, Poulsen, and Stegemoller, 2009; 
Bhagwat, Dam, and Harford, 2016; Nguyen and Phan, 2017).  
Below, we summarize the reasons that might motivate and interfere with the insiders, 




 On one hand, the EOD stock price manipulation might facilitate an M&A transaction 
by benefiting the insiders of the target or acquirer firm. We call this the deal-strengthening 
manipulation M&A conjecture. The incentives of the EOD stock price manipulation might 
occur to the target stock price in the case of M&A deals financed with cash, stock, or a 
combination of both. The target firm insiders can engage in EOD target stock price 
manipulation in order to improve target firm valuation before the anticipated acquisition 
attempt. Given that the negotiations prior to the announcement can take several months, there 
is usually sufficient time to manipulate the EOD stock price to be used in the deal. There are 
incentives to manipulate the target stock price irrespective of the deal currency, because the 
manipulation will benefit the target insiders in either case. The target shareholders can either 
obtain more cash in all-cash acquisitions, or obtain a higher equity ratio when they are paid in 
stock.  
The incentives of the EOD stock price manipulation might occur also to the acquirer 
stock price where the medium of exchange is stock or a combination of cash and stock. In those 
deals where the exchange currency is the acquirer’s stock there are also incentives to 
manipulate EOD acquirer stock prices in order to strengthen the M&A deal fundamentals. An 
acquirer may attempt to distort the EOD stock price in order to reduce the acquisition cost, 
rendering the deal otherwise unattractive, and thus, unlikely will be approved by shareholders.  
We use an illustrative example of the 2015 Samsung C&T merger with Cheil 
Industries. Reported by CNBC on 7 December 2015, the Samsung Group faced allegations of 
insider trading and EOD price manipulation during the merger.6 The price manipulation 
enabled the deal to be narrowly approved by shareholders7 despite the objections of several 
major shareholders, such as U.S. hedge fund Elliott Associates, who objected to the 





undervalued offer price and the transfer of wealth to insiders such as Samsung’s founding Lee 
family.8 Due to this, the head of Korea’s National Pension Service was indicted in January 
2017,9 followed by key Samsung executives in February 2017.10 The Samsung case shows that 
manipulation enabled the merger, despite the low premium offered, to the benefit of insiders. 
However, there is some hope that the enforcement action taken in this case may serve to curtail 
future manipulation activity around the time of subsequent mergers.11  
The Samsung case suggests that manipulation was used to ensure that otherwise 
unattractive M&A deals nevertheless proceed. It shows that,12 if insiders involved in the 
manipulation scheme benefit, the likelihood that the deal will be withdrawn decreases. EOD 
prices are not only important to set merger prices, but they are also used for options tied to the 
equity price, as well as for the compensation schemes of key insiders in the merging firms 
(Aitken, Cumming, and Zhan, 2015). As such, manipulators have pronounced incentives to 
distort EOD stock prices. This suggests that the EOD stock price manipulation either of the 
target or acquirer stock might affect the M&A outcome and lower the withdrawal probability. 
 
The discussion above leads us to the following conjecture:  EOD manipulation enables 
gains to insiders who can set M&A prices and compensation terms, trade ahead of M&A 
announcements, and thereby incentivize insiders not to withdraw announced M&A deals. 
  
Yet, on the other hand, EOD stock price distortions may increase the withdrawal 
probability, because it can have negative consequences for firm value. If the agreed terms of 








the M&A deal are based on distorted EOD stock prices, the agreement may fail due to an 
increased uncertainty. We call this the deal-weakening manipulation M&A conjecture.  
There are two primary reasons why stock price manipulation can make the target or 
acquirer less attractive (Aitken, Cumming, and Zhan, 2015a). First, EOD target stock price 
manipulation lowers long-term equity values and firm liquidity. As such, the target firm may 
be less desirable at the given price set for the transaction in either the stock-or-cash-financed 
acquisitions. In addition, the EOD acquirer stock price manipulation can make its stock less 
desirable as a deal currency for the target. Second, EOD stock price manipulation makes firms’ 
share prices less informative. Information quality has significant consequences in the process 
of deal making (Marquardt and Zur, 2015). Martin and Shalev (2016) claim that when the 
acquirer discovers negative information about the target after the announcement it can 
downwardly revise its estimate, thus prompting a withdrawal decision. In turn, EOD stock price 
manipulation increases uncertainty associated with the deal and the probability that the deal 
will be withdrawn increases.  The deceitful tactics might be discovered by either the target or 
the acquirer firm, which may lead to the deal being called off.  
Bagnoli and Lipman (1996) show in a theoretical model that the incentives to 
manipulate the target’s stock price might also be performed by the acquirer himself. In their 
model, they show that the acquirer initiates the takeover bid just in order to make profits from 
an increased target’s firm stock price, by selling its shares in the target firm, and then withdraws 
its offer. This is supported by several examples such as the Trump's takeover proposal of 
AMR's that raised its stock price by 20%, it was later withdrawn.13 Another example, is when 
T Boone Pickens' Mesa Limited Partnership announced the acquisition of Homestake Mining 
                                                 
13 Bagnoli and Lipman (1996) and Wall Street Journal, October 6, 1989. 
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Company in 1988. After an increase in the stock price, Pickens liquidated his position. The 
SEC investigated this as stock price manipulation.14  
Thus, EOD stock price manipulation can make target firms less desirable in both stock- 
and-cash-financed acquisitions because the acquirer’s shares may be less valuable if it acquires 
the target in stock-financed acquisitions. Therefore, EOD stock price manipulation might 
increase the probability of the deal being withdrawn.  
The discussion above leads us to the following conjectures:  
 EOD manipulation lowers long-term equity values and hence lowers the attractiveness 
of the M&A, thereby increasing the probability of withdrawal and lowering the premium 
associated with an M&A deal. 
EOD manipulation renders share prices less informative, thereby increasing uncertainty 
and increasing the probability of withdrawal of an announced M&A deal 
It is difficult to predict ex-ante which conjecture dominates so we propose a null 
hypothesis that either the target’s or the acquirer’s EOD stock price manipulation has no effect 
on the probability of the deal withdrawal.  
EOD target stock price manipulation also affects the premiums paid for M&A targets. 
The acquirer might anticipate that the target firm might try to boost its valuation through stock 
price manipulation, and thus offer a lower premium to offset the potential effects. Dionne, La 
Haye, and Bergerès (2015) find that information asymmetry between the bidder and target 
firms is an important determinant of the premium paid in the transaction. Better-informed 
bidders pay lower premiums in M&A transactions. Furthermore, as suggested by Tarsalewska 
(2018), the premiums paid to target firms generally decrease with uncertainty. Therefore, we 
predict that greater uncertainty regarding target firm valuation may decrease the premium.  
                                                 
14 Bagnoli and Lipman (1996) and Wall Street Journal, October 6, 1989. 
15 
 
Finally, as the Samsung case suggests, we posit that regulation and enforcement curtails 
manipulation around mergers. The regulation-strengthening manipulation M&A conjecture 
states that regulations to curtail manipulation make it less prevalent and less severe, thereby 
increasing equity values and price informativeness. This encourages trading activity, which 
also lowers the probability of an M&A withdrawal, lessens the impact of any manipulation on 
an M&A withdrawal, and lessens the negative impact of manipulation on the premium 
associated with an M&A. These effects are more likely to be observed if market manipulation 
regulation is effectively enforced, and less likely if it is not.  
The discussion above leads us to the following conjecture: Regulation curtailing EOD 
manipulation makes manipulation less prevalent and less severe, thereby increasing equity 
values and price informativeness, lowering the probability of an M&A withdrawal, lowering 
the severity of the impact of manipulation on an M&A withdrawal, and lowering the severity 
of the negative impact of manipulation on the premium associated with an M&A dealThese 
predictions are empirically tested in the remainder of the paper. 
 
DATA 
We obtain a sample of mergers and acquisitions from the Thomson One SDC database 
and supplement it with data from Zephyr. We identify completed and withdrawn transactions 
worldwide from 2003 through 2014, where the target firm is publicly traded (i.e., a public 
target). Our sample begins in 2003, because data on market manipulation is not available prior 
to that year. We follow standard sample selection criteria. In particular, we require that the 
acquirer seeks to buy more than 50% of the target, and we further limit our sample to deals in 
which the target has daily stock return data, this enables us to calculate the market manipulation 
measures. We also include only deals where the value of the transaction is higher than $10 
million. We use the Thomson Reuters databases as our primary source of annual accounting 
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data for at least one year prior to the deal announcement. Where necessary, we supplement the 
accounting information using DatAnalysis, Orbis, and Compustat.  
The manipulation data come from SMARTS, Inc., and Capital Markets CRC (CMCRC) 
in Sydney. SMARTS and CMCRC collect data on suspected manipulation cases for over fifty 
stock exchanges around the world, and are used by regulators in those countries. We do not use 
actual enforced cases, because enforcement varies widely in practice across countries. Instead, 
we use suspected cases, because they can influence investors’ activities and perceptions, and 
hence have real financial consequences (Aitken, Cumming, and Zhan, 2015b). 
Table 1, panel A, presents our sample construction. The final sample with the required 
data for deal withdrawal analysis totals 2,749 deals, where 324 (12%) announced deals were 
terminated. The final sample with the required data for premium analysis is 1,883, where 232 
(11%) announced deals were terminated. The proportion of withdrawn deals is similar to 
previously reported numbers (Skaife and Wangerin, 2013). Also, similarly to previous studies 
(Golubov, Petmezas, and Travlos, 2016), our sample exhibits the well documented merger 
wave pattern, with a period of increased activity around 2007 and a subsequent decrease in the 
number of deals after the 2008 financial crisis.  
Table 1 shows our sample composition by year in panel B and by industry in panel C. 
The proportions are similar to other recent cross-country M&A studies (Bris and Cabolis, 
2008). In panel D, we present distributions by country. The final sample includes deals 
spanning forty-five countries. The first column of Table 1, panel D, gives the total number of 
announced deals. The countries that dominate in our sample are the U.S., Canada, Australia, 
and the UK. In the next two columns, we categorize the deals as either completed or withdrawn. 
Subsequently, we provide the average premium paid for the target in an M&A deal. The last 
three columns show, respectively, the number of EOD target stock price manipulations prior 
to the M&A announcement, and the number of EOD cases that resulted in deal withdrawal or 
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deal completion. India, Switzerland, France, and Australia have the highest percentages of 
manipulation cases scaled by the total number of withdrawn deals. We find that EOD target 
stock price manipulation occurred in more than 20% of withdrawn deals.  
[Please insert Table 1 here] 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
This section describes our research design. We employ two different econometric 
procedures to examine the effect of EOD stock price manipulation on the deal withdrawal 
probability and premiums paid. First, we estimate a regression model using a pooled sample. 
We use a logit regression model when the outcome variable is an integer variable, or we use 
the OLS model when the outcome variable is continuous. Second, we use a control sample of 
propensity score matched control observations. In order to test our predictions, we estimate the 
following regression model: 
 
OUTCOME = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1EOD MANIPULATION + 𝛽2INDUSTRY + 𝛽3TOEHOLD +
 𝛽4STOCK + 𝛽5CASH +    𝛽6HOSTILE +  𝛽7PUBLICBIDDER + 𝛽8LEVERAGE +  𝛽9PB +
𝛽10ROA + 𝛿𝑛FE +           (1) 
 
Where OUTCOME is either 1) WITHDRAWN that is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the 
deal is withdrawn, and 0 otherwise; or 2) PREMIUM that is the premium of the offer price to 
the share price four weeks before the announcement. In each regression, we include proxies for 
EOD price manipulation, which is our main independent variable: 1) EODPD is an indicator 
variable that equals 1 if the dislocation of EOD price is detected over thirty days before the 
announcement date, and 0 otherwise, and 2) EODPD_T is the average trading value as a 
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percentage of the daily trading volume surrounding each suspected dislocating EOD target 
price case.15  
EOD price manipulation measures are constructed by a surveillance team from 
CMCRC and SMARTS, Inc. The formal definition is provided in the Appendix. In brief, an 
EOD price is dislocated if, in the fifteen minutes before the continuous trading period, it is four 
standard deviations away from its mean price change during the past 100-trading day 
benchmarking period, and then reverts back to the benchmark price range the following 
morning.  
Following prior literature, we include several control variables (Walkling, 1985; Betton 
and Eckbo, 2000). Deals are less likely to be withdrawn if the target and acquirer firm operate 
in the same industry. We include an indicator variable INDUSTRY that equals 1 if firms are 
within the same industry (e.g., have the same two-digit SIC code), and 0 otherwise. There is 
some evidence that deals are less likely to be withdrawn if the acquirer already owns a certain 
percentage of the target firm. However, as Skaife and Wangerin (2013) suggest, there is a 
possibility that the cost of integration might outweigh the benefits. Therefore, we include the 
initial ownership of the acquirer (TOEHOLD) and leave the sign on the coefficient unassigned.  
The method of payment also affects the probability of deal withdrawal. Ben-David, 
Drake, and Roulstone (2015) claim that misvaluation is a strong determinant of merger 
decisions, as well as the use of stock or cash as the payment currency. Shleifer and Vishny 
(2003) show that deals where stock is used as the method of payment are more likely to be 
withdrawn, while deals using cash, as the method of payment, are less likely to be withdrawn. 
Therefore, we include two integer variables, STOCK and CASH.  
                                                 
15 In an earlier version of this paper, we used other proxies for manipulation such as information leakage variables. 
Those variables were insignificant, and, as such, they are not included here, but are available upon request. 
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The probability of withdrawal and premiums paid also depends on the overall “attitude” 
of the deal. If the nature of the deal is hostile, it is more likely to be withdrawn. We, therefore, 
include an integer variable if the deal is hostile (HOSTILE). Public bidders are more likely to 
overpay for the deal, and it is thus more likely the deal will be completed. We include an integer 
variable that equals 1 if the acquirer is a public firm (PUBLICBIDDER).  
We also include three additional control variables that proxy for the financial position 
of the firm (LEVERAGE), its growth opportunities (PB), and its profitability (ROA), consistent 
with other research showing financial position is pertinent to acquisitions, such as indicated by 
Harford, Klasa, and Walcott (2009). Finally, we include industry, year and country fixed 
effects. All variables are as defined in Table A1 in the appendix. The t-statistics are based on 
industry-clustered errors (Petersen, 2009). The findings are robust to clustering by time and/or 
by country.  
Second, we use propensity score matching, following Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), 
in order to create a control group of deals that are similar to the treated deals i.e. with EOD 
stock price manipulation. We match the deals based on industry, year, and country. This 
procedure involves the following steps. First, we estimate propensity scores for all EOD 
stock price manipulation in our sample by estimating a logit model of EOD stock price 
manipulation on industry, year, and country variables. We then match EOD stock price 
manipulation deals and non- EOD stock price manipulation deals based on propensity scores 
using nearest neighbor matching. Second, we test whether means of the control variables 
differ between the treated and control samples. We find no significant differences between 
the treated and control sample except their public status, that the target and the acquirer are in 
the same industry and 100% stock payment. Yet, we control for those variables in the 
regression.16 Third, we run a following regression model specified in Equation (1).  
                                                 




SUMMARY STATISTICS AND UNIVARIATE TESTS 
In Table 2, we present descriptive statistics for completed (column 1) and withdrawn 
(column 2) deals. In the last two columns, we provide the difference in means between 
withdrawn and completed deals, as well as the t-test for significance. We also provide the 
descriptive for the manipulation measures. The mean EODPD over thirty days before the deal 
announcement date is lower for a subsample of completed deals. The difference in means for 
the mean EODPD is statistically significant.  
We present the descriptive for shorter periods, i.e., EODPD[-20; 0] over twenty days; 
and EODPD[-10; 0] over ten days before the deal announcement date. The results are similar. 
The mean in EODPD_T over thirty days before the deal announcement date is also lower for a 
subsample of completed deals, which implies inferences similar to those above. For 
consistency, we also present the descriptive statistics for EODPD_T over different time 
periods.  
Other controls are as expected, such as, the toehold is higher for completed deals, and 
the announcements of hostile deals are more likely to be terminated. Cash offers are more likely 
to be completed; stock offers are more likely to be withdrawn. A greater percentage of deals 
initiated by public bidders is completed. Targets in completed deals seem to have lower 
leverage, higher price-to-book ratios, and lower return on assets.  
 
[Please insert Table 2 here] 
 
In Table 3, we show the correlations among our variables. EODPD and EODPD_T are 
significantly positively correlated with WITHDRAWN. This indicates that target price 
manipulation increases the probability of a deal termination. EODPD and EODPD_T are 
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significantly positively correlated with PREMIUM. Other variables are also significantly 
correlated with WITHDRAWN, suggesting they are important controls in our regressions.  
 
[Please insert Table 3 here] 
 
MULTIVARIATE RESULTS 
In this section, we empirically test which conjecture dominates i.e. the M&A deal-
strengthening or the M&A deal-weakening. We divide our empirical analysis into two parts. 
First, we analyse the effect of EOD target stock price manipulation on the M&A outcomes. 
Second, we analyse the effect of EOD acquirer stock price manipulation on the M&A 
outcomes.  
 
Target price manipulation, deal withdrawal, and premium 
In Tables 4 to 6 we present the results of estimating Equation (1). In each table columns 
1 and 2 present the estimated coefficients where we use the pooled sample, while columns 3 
and 4 show the results for the sample of treated and control deals matched by year, industry, 
and country.  
In Table 4, the results show that EOD target stock price dislocation (EODPD) increases 
the probability that a deal will be withdrawn by 12.3% (Model 1) and by 10.6% (Model 3). 
Moreover, higher trading values around EOD target stock price manipulation (EODPD_T) by 
approximately 1 standard deviation increase the probability of deal withdrawal by 5% (Model 
2). 
 




Table 5 presents the results of estimating Equation (1) where we also control for the 
possibility of overbidding. We include PREMIUM and COMPETING as additional controls. 
PREMIUM is computed as the ratio of the offer price to the target’s share price four weeks 
prior to the announcement date as reported by Thomson One SDC (Boone and Mulherin, 2007). 
COMPETING is an indicator variable that equals 1 if there was a competing bidder, and 0 
otherwise. The findings in Table 5 are consistent with those in Table 5 for the presence of EOD 
target stock price dislocation in Models 1 and 3, but with higher economic significance, 16.2% 
(Model 1) and 10.7% (Model 3). The findings in Table 6 are also consistent with those in Table 
5 for the trading values around EOD target stock price dislocation, with a slightly larger effect 
in Model 2 and a slightly smaller effect in Model 4. 
 
[Please insert Table 5 here] 
 
 As expected, the control variables are significant in Tables 4 and 5. Deals are more 
likely when the bidder and target are in the same industry. Toeholds increase the probability of 
withdrawal in the matched sample, but not in the full sample. Stock bids, hostile bids, and 
higher target leverage all tend to increase the probability of withdrawal.  
 Table 6 presents the results of estimating the effect of target price manipulation on the 
premium. The data indicates that deal premiums are approximately 22% (Model 1) to 25% 
(Model 3) lower for targets with EOD dislocated stock prices. Furthermore, a 1-standard 
deviation increase in trading value around EOD target stock price dislocation reduces 
premiums by between 16% (Model 2) and 12% (Model 4).  
 The control variables, moreover, are consistent with expectations in Table 6. Premiums 
are higher when the target and bidder are in the same industry, cash is used, the deal is hostile, 
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and the bidder is public. Premiums are lower for stock deals, toeholds, and when the target has 
greater leverage. 
[Please insert Table 6 here] 
 
Overall, these results support the deal-weakening M&A conjecture. EOD target stock 
price manipulation weakens the deal. It increases the withdrawal probability and premiums 
paid.  
In subsequent analysis, we distinguish between positive and negative EOD target stock 
price manipulation. We present the results in Table 7 where the main dependent variable is 
WITHDRAWN in Models 1 and 2, and PREMIUM in Models 3 and 4. We explicitly test for 
positive versus negative EOD target stock price dislocations. The findings remain consistent, 
and show a slightly larger effect of positive EOD dislocations on deal withdrawals (marginal 
effect is 13.4%) than negative dislocations (marginal effect is 9.8%). Similarly, the reduction 
in deal premiums is smaller with negative EOD dislocations (a 20% reduction for a 1-standard 
deviation increase) than with positive dislocations (a 25% reduction for a 1-standard deviation 
increase). The findings pertaining to the additional control variables are consistent with those 
reported earlier. 
 
[Please insert Table 7 here] 
 
Acquirer price manipulation and deal withdrawal 
In this subsection, we analyse the EOD acquirer stock price manipulation. Overall, we 
find 50 cases where the EOD stock price of the acquirer is dislocated. In Table 8, we present 
the results of estimating Equation (1). In column 1, we present the estimated coefficients where 
we use the pooled sample; in column 2, the results for the sample of treated and control deals 
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matched by year, industry, and target and country; in columns 3-5 we present the results for 
the subsample of deals paid in stock. The results show that EOD acquirer stock price 
dislocation (EODPD) has no effect on the withdrawal probability. Thus, we find no significant 
evidence that EOD acquirer stock price manipulation having any effect on the probability of 
withdrawal (Table 9, column 1-2). 
We subsequently analyze only those deals where the stock was the method of payment 
(Table 8, columns 3-5). Our analysis reveals that positive (up) EOD acquirer stock price 
dislocations increases the probability of withdrawal by 25.6% (column 4). The negative (down) 
EOD acquirer stock price dislocations has not significant effect on the probability of 
withdrawal (column 5). This findings are consistent with the intuition that the price of the 
acquirer typically drops. Thus, a manipulated price in the opposite direction would be a bad 
signal of expected problems, and could impede deal completion. Acquirer stock as an exchange 
currency becomes overvalued, and may lead to a deal withdrawal. In summary, these results 
indicate that the positive EOD acquirer price manipulation also increases the probability of a 
deal withdrawal when the stock is the medium of exchange and supports the deal-weakening 
M&A conjecture.  
 
 [Please insert Table 8 here] 
 
Regulation and manipulation  
We also test whether any of the major regulatory changes that affected trading rules in 
European countries impact our predictions. In November 2007, the Directive on Markets in 
Financial Instruments (MiFID) harmonized trading rules across Europe (Cumming, Johan, and 
Li, 2011). The authors used the MiFID date for the implementation of the 2004 Market Abuse 
Directive (MAD), because the timing of the implementation of surveillance alerts (computer 
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software used to detect rules in MAD) came about at the same time as the MiFID 
implementation (see also Cumming and Johan, 2008). This regulatory change was perceived 
as an exogenous shock, because the rule was not implemented by a single exchange or country, 
but was instead imposed by the European Commission for all member states. The trading rules 
in Cumming, Johan, and Li (2011) capture the rule changes brought about by MAD, and reflect 
the magnitude of the rule changes in the different European exchanges. They are used to test 
the regulation-strengthening manipulation M&A conjecture.  
Tables 9 and 10 present the results of estimating the effect of EOD target stock price 
manipulation on deal termination and deal premiums, respectively. In Table 9, Model 1, we 
interact EOD target stock price manipulation with Market Manipulation Index (MMI). In 
Model 2, we interact it with Insider Trading Index (ITI). In Model 3, we interact it with Broker 
Agency Index (BAI). These indices are defined in the appendix, and are correlated with 
surveillance (the first step in enforcement; see Cumming and Johan, 2008). Specifically, 
Cumming, Johan, and Li (2011) define these variables with respect to the changes made over 
time to ensure proper enforcement in terms of computer surveillance. 
 [Please insert Tables 9 and 10 here] 
 The data in Table 9 indicates that more detailed exchange trading rules, in terms of the 
MMI and the ITI reduce the probability of a deal withdrawal. Each additional rule reduces the 
probability by 3%-8% in Models 1-2. This is as expected, because regulation improves 
transaction certainty and liquidity (Cumming, Johan, and Li, 2011). However, counter to 
expectations, in Model 3, more detailed broker agency rules increase the probability of deal 
withdrawal. This suggests that brokers are more inclined to facilitate deals when they are less 
regulated (each additional BAI rule increases the probability of deal withdrawal by 2.4%). The 
data further indicates that more detailed rules make the effect of manipulation on withdrawal 
less severe, where each additional rule reduces the effect by approximately 0.9%-1.4% in 
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Models 1-3. This latter finding is consistent with the regulation-strengthening manipulation 
M&A conjecture.  
Table 10 shows that more detailed exchange trading rules do not have a direct effect on 
lowering the premiums paid in M&A deals. Nevertheless, the data indicates that premiums are 
significantly higher in the presence of stricter trading rules when there is manipulation, and 
economic significance ranges from 1.2% (Model 2) to 2.6% (Model 3) higher. These findings 
are not expected. One explanation is that the higher risk of an indictment associated with EOD 
stock price manipulation, in the presence of stricter regulation, requires a higher premium paid 
to the manipulator. This is consistent with Becker’s (1968) theory of crime (the reward must 
be greater in order to incentivize an illegal act in the presence of a greater risk and the cost of 
being caught).  
 
Additional robustness checks 
 Over the course of our analyses, we carried out several additional tests that we do not 
include here for the sake of brevity. However, they are available upon request. First, we 
considered other legal indices, such as those in La Porta et al. (1998) and La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, and Shleifer (2006). We found no material effect relative to those presented in the 
tables. Second, we run our tests on subsamples: 1) we excluded selected countries, such as the 
U.S. and the U.K; 2) considered domestic versus international mergers; 3) excluded all 
countries with zero observations of suspected EOD market manipulations; and 4) excluded the 
financial industry. We found no material differences.  
Third, we considered subsets of our data based on time, and found the results to be quite 
stable. Fourth, we checked whether our results are robust to the changes in the definition of the 
EOD manipulation. Due to the computational requirements, we limited the sample for this test 
to 4 countries where we have the most observations: Australia, Canada, the UK, and the US. 
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In the paper, we had a threshold for dislocation defined as, “A price movement is dislocated if 
it is four standard deviations away from the mean price change during the past 100-trading day 
benchmarking period, and if it reverts back to the mean level the next morning.” We decided 
to check how the number of observations for EOD stock manipulation varies when we change 
the dislocation threshold from 4 to 3.5, and from 4 to 4.5. We found that are results are robust 
to the changes in the EOD stock manipulation threshold.  
Fifth, we analysed whether the results of estimating the effect of EOD target stock price 
manipulation on deal termination changed where we also control for media, month-end, 
quarter-end.17 The findings, with the additional control variables, continue to show consistent 
results in each of the specifications, regardless of which additional controls are included.  
Sixth, we analyzed whether the inclusion of both target and acquirer EOD price 
manipulations affect the results. We found only four cases where the price of the target and the 
acquirer were manipulated simultaneously, so these cases were too few to materially affect the 
probability of withdrawal.  
Finally, we analysed the effect of information leakage on the probability of withdrawal 
and premiums paid. We found only thirty-five cases for the target and only one for the acquirer. 
We did not include these results because they were insignificant, yet are available upon request. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The goal of this paper is to examine whether EOD stock price manipulation affects the 
likelihood of M&A deal withdrawal and premiums paid. In theory, EOD manipulation could 
increase the likelihood of a deal, if there are gains to the insiders associated with manipulation.  
Target management may try to pump up deal prices when they feel they have a strong 
                                                 
17 MEDIA is the newspaper coverage that is the count of press articles in the month prior to the M&A 
announcement. MONTH_END is an indicator variable equal to one if there was a month-end, and zero 
otherwise. QUARTER_END is an indicator variable equal to one if there was a month-end, and zero otherwise. 
All the data were provided by CMCRC.  
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negotiating position and the bidder is not likely to withdraw the deal; also, target management 
may try to inflate deal process to increase the probability of an undesirable hostile takeover 
withdrawal.  Acquirors may try to decrease value when they want to pay a lower premium. 
Based on M&As from over 45 countries from 2003-2014, we find that target price 
manipulation increases uncertainty and volatility with prices, reduces M&A premiums, and 
makes announced deals more likely to be withdrawn. This confirms the deal-weakening 
manipulation M&A conjecture. Our results are robust by using several proxies for target price 
manipulation and to control for overbidding. They are also robust when we control for media 
and for specific dates. Target price manipulation lowers the premiums paid in M&A deals. 
These effects hold regardless of the direction of the manipulation.  
Overall, the data is consistent with stock price manipulations bringing down the 
premium prior to an acquisition.  One might strategically trade prior to a tender offer to reduce 
the cost of a tender offer.  However, is it legal in terms of trading rules, and can it be detected 
in terms of computer surveillance?  No, at least for most countries and time period covered by 
our analyses.  That is, our results confirm the regulation-strengthening manipulation M&A 
conjecture, indicating that regulation-reducing manipulation makes the impact of target price 
manipulation on M&A outcomes less severe. In fact, more detailed exchange trading rules 
reduce the probability of deal withdrawal, as well as, the severity of the effect of manipulation 
on an M&A withdrawal. We find that more detailed exchange trading rules increase the 
premiums associated with deals that are subject to manipulation. This is consistent with 
Becker’s (1968) prediction that higher costs and enforcement requires greater benefits to 
wrongdoers to incentivize them to undertake illegal activities.  It is also consistent with the 
liquidity improvements with trading rules (Cumming et al., 2011) and surveillance (Cumming 
and Johan, 2008). 
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We find that acquirer share price manipulations are less common than target share price 
manipulations prior to M&As. A subset of these manipulations materially affected the 
probability of deal completion. In particular, positive manipulation of acquirer shares in stock 
transactions increased the probability of deal withdrawal. 
The paper has several limitations. First, our results need to be interpreted with caution 
due to the self-selection problem present in M&A studies that firms might self-select into 
becoming a target or acquirer based on some unobservable characteristics. Second, the data on 
the EOD stock price manipulation are the suspected cases not the actually prosecuted. Third, 
we focus only on the probability of withdrawal of the M&A transaction. Future research could 
examine the impact of market manipulation on the long-term performance of completed 
mergers. It would also be instructive to examine the long-term performance differences 
between one-off acquirers and serial acquirers around manipulated M&As. Research in the 
future could likewise examine the role of different intermediaries (such as investment banks, 
auditors, lawyers) in mitigating the impact of market manipulation on M&As.  These issues 
could help explain why some deals are more likely to go through. They could also better inform 
practitioners and policymakers about the causes and consequences of the interactions between 
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Table 1. Sample construction and composition 
 
This table presents the sample construction and the distribution of our sample by announcement 
year, target Fama-French industry, and target country for M&A deals announced between 2003 
and 2014 in which the acquirer was seeking to buy more than 50% of the target.  
 






    
Number of observations with required 
data for deal termination analysis 2,425 324 2,749 
% 88% 12% 100% 
    
Number of observations with required 
data for premium analysis 1,883 232 2,115 
% 89% 11% 100% 






2003 147 21 168 
2004 156 33 189 
2005 204 23 227 
2006 281 49 330 
2007 318 50 368 
2008 181 54 235 
2009 164 20 184 
2010 206 16 222 
2011 226 10 236 
2012 208 16 224 
2013 174 16 190 
2014 160 16 176 
Total 2,425 324 2,749 






Consumer Non-Durables 110 19 129 
Consumer Durables  40 7 47 
Manufacturing  179 23 202 
Oil, Gas, and Coal  231 36 267 
Chemicals and Allied Products 47 5 52 
Business Equipment 565 50 615 
Telephone and Television Transmission 81 15 96 
Utilities 54 11 65 
Wholesale, Retail, and Some Services 159 22 181 
Healthcare, Medical Equipment, Drug 300 24 324 
Finance 197 22 219 
Other 462 90 552 
Total 2,425 324 2,749 
Table 1. Sample construction and composition - continued 
 















Number of EOD 
Manipulations 
Prior to Merger 
Announcement 





# of EOD 
Cases that 
Resulted in a 
Completed 
M&A Deal 
Argentina 2 2 0 n/a 0 0 0 
Australia 227 163 64 37.48 33 15 18 
Austria 11 9 2 28.94 0 0 0 
Belgium 17 15 2 38.13 0 0 0 
Bermuda 36 34 2 14.16 4 0 4 
Brazil 16 15 1 12.75 0 0 0 
British Virgin  1 1 0 -13.33 0 0 0 
Bulgaria 2 2 0 62.22 0 0 0 
Canada 524 459 65 40.88 24 7 17 
Cayman Islands 16 16 0 -2.31 1 0 1 
China 6 6 0 -8.41 1 0 1 
Colombia  2 2 0 n/a 0 0 0 
Czech Republic 2 2 0 n/a 0 0 0 
Denmark 19 17 2 40.85 0 0 0 
Egypt 5 4 1 -8.12 0 0 0 
Finland 13 12 1 42.78 0 0 0 
France 56 53 3 28.26 5 1 4 
Germany 88 84 4 35.31 0 0 0 
Greece 1 1 0 24.76 0 0 0 
Hong Kong 4 3 1 17.42 0 0 0 
India 13 12 1 56.07 3 1 2 
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Table 1. Sample construction and composition - continued 
 
Indonesia 8 8 0 21.41 0 0 0 
Ireland 1 0 1 31.40 0 0 0 
Israel 1 0 1 3.32 0 0 0 
Italy 5 4 1 -0.05 0 0 0 
Japan 19 15 4 22.23 0 0 0 
Korea Republic 5 4 1 85.85 0 0 0 
Malaysia 5 4 1 30.92 0 0 0 
Morocco 1 1 0 n/a 0 0 0 
New Zealand 4 1 3 28.64 0 0 0 
Nigeria 1 1 0 n/a 0 0 0 
Peru 1 1 0 -5.48 0 0 0 
Philippines 1 1 0 50.00 0 0 0 
Poland 8 5 3 14.31 0 0 0 
Portugal 3 1 2 19.42 0 0 0 
Russia 7 7 0 n/a 0 0 0 
Singapore 8 3 5 64.00 1 1 0 
Slovenia 1 1 0 -44.69 0 0 0 
Spain 19 17 2 23.90 0 0 0 
Sweden 4 3 1 15.92 0 0 0 
Switzerland 25 19 6 21.03 7 4 3 
Taiwan 1 0 1 20.56 0 0 0 
United Kingdom 140 126 14 38.34 6 2 4 
United States 1,419 1,290 129 41.73 50 7 43 
Vietnam  1 1 0 n/a 0 0 0 
Totals 2,749 2,425 324 39.13 135 38 97 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
This table shows the summary statistics for the variables used in our base model. The sample 
includes all mergers and acquisitions announced between 2003 and 2014 in which the acquirer 
was seeking to buy more than 50% of the target. The sample size consists of 2,749 deals, where 
324 are withdrawn and 2,425 are completed. PREMIUM, LEVERAGE, PB, and ROA are 
winsorized at the 99% level. All variables are defined in the appendix. 
 
 (1) (2) (2) - (1)  
 Withdrawn deals  Completed deals Difference 
in Mean 
 
  Mean SD Mean SD t-stat 
Manipulation measures 
EODPD [-30;0] 0.1173 0.3223 0.0400 0.1960 -0.0773 -6.08 
EODPD [-20;0] 0.0833 0.2768 0.0264 0.1603 -0.0569 -5.41 
EODPD [-10;0] 0.0432 0.2036 0.0136 0.1159 -0.0296 -3.87 
EODPD_T [-30;0] 0.0159 0.0849 0.0037 0.0394 -0.0122 -4.37 
EODPD_T [-20;0] 0.0136 0.0826 0.0026 0.0315 -0.0110 -4.53 
EODPD_T [-10;0] 0.0085 0.0703 0.0009 0.0161 -0.0077 -4.54 
EODPD_N 0.0556 0.2294 0.0202 0.1407 -0.0353 -3.88 
EODPD_P 0.0617 0.2410 0.0198 0.1393 -0.0419 -4.58 
Controls       
PREMIUM 34.6299 47.3682 39.7266 43.0353 5.0967 1.88 
INDUSTRY 0.4167 0.4938 0.5130 0.4999 0.0963 3.26 
TOEHOLD 3.9717 9.7775 1.8701 6.9832 -2.1016 -4.82 
STOCK 0.1883 0.3915 0.1295 0.3358 -0.0588 -2.90 
CASH 0.5926 0.4921 0.6256 0.4841 0.0330 1.15 
HOSTILE 0.0741 0.2623 0.0082 0.0905 -0.0658 -8.99 
PUBLICBIDDER 0.5370 0.4994 0.6219 0.4850 0.0848 2.95 
CROSS-COUNTRY 0.2469 0.4319 0.2384 0.4262 -0.0086 -0.34 
LEVERAGE 7.9955 34.6653 3.3803 22.4781 -4.6152 -3.22 
PB 1.5207 2.5825 1.8798 2.7910 0.3592 2.19 




Table 3. Correlation Table 
 
This table shows Pearson correlations for the variables used in our base model. All variables are defined in the appendix. 
 
Note: * p < 0.05.  
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1 WITHDRAWN 1.00              
2 PREMIUM -0.04 1.00             
3 EODPD 0.13* -0.08* 1.00            
4 EODPD_T 0.10* -0.02 0.46* 1.00           
5 INDUSTRY -0.08* 0.08* -0.13* -0.05* 1.00          
6 TOEHOLD 0.09* -0.05* 0.05* 0.04* -0.08* 1.00         
7 STOCK 0.04 -0.08* -0.07* -0.04 0.18* -0.01 1.00        
8 CASH -0.02 0.06* 0.01 0.02 -0.24* 0.04* -0.54* 1.00       
9 HOSTILE 0.17* 0.04 -0.02 0.02 0.02 0.06* -0.01 0.01 1.00      
10 PUBLICBIDDER -0.07* 0.04* -0.03 -0.04 0.32* -0.11* 0.30* -0.40* 0.04 1.00     
11 CROSS-COUNTRY 0.01 0.02 0.02 -0.01 -0.00 0.02 -0.09* 0.10* 0.05* 0.00 1.00    
12 LEVERAGE 0.09* -0.06* -0.01 -0.00 -0.03 0.05* -0.02 0.03 0.02 -0.07* 0.07* 1.00   
13 PB -0.05* -0.04 0.01 0.00 0.05* -0.05* 0.01 -0.03 -0.03 0.16* -0.03 0.10* 1.00  
14 ROA 0.04* -0.03 0.01 0.06* -0.04* 0.02 -0.04 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.04* 0.04* -0.01 1.00 
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Table 4. Target price manipulation and deal withdrawal 
 
This table shows the main results of the regression analysis where the main dependent variable 
is WITHDRAWN. Models 1 and 2 are estimated for the full sample, which consists of all 
mergers and acquisitions announced between 2003 and 2014 in which the acquirer was seeking 
to buy more than 50% of the target. All regressions include constant, country, year, and Fama-
French industry dummies. Models 3 and 4 are estimated for a propensity score matched sample 
(based on Fama-French industry, year, and country). EODPD_T, LEVERAGE, PB, and ROA 
are winsorized at the 99% level. ***, **, and * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, 
respectively. Marginal effects are reported. Standard errors are clustered by country. All 
variables are defined in the appendix. 
 
 Full Sample Matched Sample 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
EODPD 0.1231***  0.1059**  
 [4.00]  [2.38]  
EODPD_T  0.8721***  0.8108** 
  [3.81]  [2.06] 
INDUSTRY -0.0241*** -0.0273*** 0.0052** 0.0047** 
 [-3.15] [-3.60] [2.19] [2.20] 
TOEHOLD 0.0008 0.0008 0.0137 -0.0089 
 [1.63] [1.57] [0.20] [-0.14] 
STOCK 0.0660*** 0.0616*** -0.0783 -0.0768 
 [3.69] [3.48] [-1.60] [-1.51] 
CASH -0.0096 -0.0108 0.3918*** 0.3567*** 
 [-0.72] [-0.78] [4.29] [3.55] 
HOSTILE 0.4278*** 0.4152*** -0.0511 -0.0468 
 [3.28] [3.18] [-1.62] [-1.33] 
PUBLICBIDDER -0.0482*** -0.0476*** -0.1203*** -0.1383*** 
 [-3.38] [-3.26] [-3.03] [-3.69] 
CROSS-COUNTRY 0.0062 0.0072 -0.0146 -0.0253 
 [0.36] [0.42] [-0.43] [-0.63] 
LEVERAGE 0.0005 0.0006 0.0004 0.0003 
 [1.30] [1.33] [0.57] [0.41] 
PB -0.0048*** -0.0046*** -0.0066* -0.0054 
 [-3.22] [-2.90] [-1.65] [-1.34] 
ROA 0.0022 0.0022 0.0081* 0.0070 
 [0.52] [0.50] [1.87] [1.31] 
     
Observations 2,749 2,749 268 268 




Table 5. Target price manipulation and deal withdrawal controlling for overbidding 
(PREMIUM, COMPETING) 
 
This table shows the main results of the regression analysis where the main dependent variable 
is WITHDRAWN. Models 1 and 2 are estimated for the full sample, which consists of all 
mergers and acquisitions announced between 2003 and 2014 in which the acquirer was seeking 
to buy more than 50% of the target. All regressions include constant, country, year, and Fama-
French industry dummies. Models 3 and 4 are estimated for a propensity score matched sample 
(based on Fama-French industry, year, and country). All variables are defined in appendix 1. 
EODPD_T, PREMIUM, LEVERAGE, PB, and ROA are winsorized at the 99% level. ***, **, 
and * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively. Marginal effects are 
reported. Standard errors are clustered by country. All variables are defined in the appendix. 
 
 Full Sample Matched Sample 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
EODPD 0.1624***  0.1065**  
 [4.88]  [2.24]  
EODPD_T  0.9375***  0.9616* 
  [4.24]  [1.94] 
PREMIUM -0.0002 -0.0002* -0.0017*** -0.0017*** 
 [-1.44] [-1.70] [-2.63] [-2.78] 
COMPETING 0.1471*** 0.1460*** 0.5249*** 0.4984*** 
 [9.15] [8.48] [4.03] [4.26] 
INDUSTRY -0.0284*** -0.0325*** 0.0038** 0.0032* 
 [-2.90] [-3.06] [2.12] [1.92] 
TOEHOLD 0.0007 0.0007 -0.0181 -0.0432 
 [1.32] [1.20] [-0.31] [-0.72] 
STOCK 0.0526*** 0.0464*** -0.1282** -0.1233** 
 [3.69] [3.37] [-2.16] [-2.04] 
CASH -0.0169 -0.0173 -0.0304 -0.0469 
 [-1.54] [-1.51] [-0.72] [-1.35] 
HOSTILE 0.2170*** 0.2066*** -0.0553 -0.0523 
 [2.81] [2.70] [-1.39] [-1.32] 
PUBLICBIDDER -0.0336*** -0.0326*** -0.0756*** -0.0828** 
 [-2.82] [-2.58] [-2.96] [-2.55] 
CROSS-COUNTRY 0.0011 0.0026 -0.0926*** -0.1067*** 
 [0.08] [0.20] [-3.93] [-5.58] 
LEVERAGE 0.0007 0.0007 0.0023*** 0.0024*** 
 [1.36] [1.36] [2.62] [2.68] 
PB -0.0027*** -0.0028** -0.0063 -0.0056 
 [-2.70] [-2.26] [-1.17] [-1.04] 
ROA 0.0019 0.0020 -0.0108 -0.0133 
 [0.53] [0.51] [-0.98] [-1.55] 
     
Observations 2,115 2,115 250 250 
Pseudo R-squared  0.2251 0.2172 0.1557 0.1541 
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Table 6. Target price manipulation and deal premium 
 
This table shows the main results of the regression analysis where the main dependent variable 
is PREMIUM. Models 1 and 2 are estimated for the full sample, which consists of all mergers 
and acquisitions announced between 2003 and 2014 in which the acquirer was seeking to buy 
more than 50% of the target. All regressions include constant, country, year, and Fama-French 
industry dummies. Models 3 and 4 are estimated for a propensity score matched sample (based 
on Fama-French industry, year, and country). EODPD_T, LEVERAGE, PB, and ROA are 
winsorized at the 99% level. ***, **, and * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, 
respectively. Marginal effects are reported. Standard errors are clustered by country. All 
variables are defined in the appendix. 
 
 Full Sample Matched Sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
EODPD -8.9644***  -9.9198**  
 [-5.70]  [-2.88]  
EODPD_T  -147.1135***  -109.1770*** 
  [-3.10]  [-4.62] 
INDUSTRY -0.1078* -0.1121* -0.2857 -0.2461 
 [-1.71] [-1.76] [-1.15] [-0.91] 
TOEHOLD -5.7782*** -5.6887*** -11.2805* -9.8327 
 [-4.26] [-4.22] [-1.94] [-1.82] 
STOCK 1.8368*** 1.8511*** 0.1584 0.2299 
 [3.53] [3.42] [0.06] [0.09] 
CASH 4.7863 5.0003 22.6672*** 24.7948*** 
 [1.25] [1.30] [8.48] [9.19] 
HOSTILE 2.2274** 2.0927** -1.5217 -3.0520 
 [2.28] [2.19] [-0.72] [-1.57] 
PUBLICBIDDER 1.8989*** 2.0464*** 3.9306 5.6155 
 [3.05] [3.39] [1.23] [1.40] 
CROSS-COUNTRY 1.3701 1.4067 8.0733*** 9.2502** 
 [1.49] [1.46] [3.77] [3.00] 
LEVERAGE -0.0423** -0.0471** -0.0302** -0.0410 
 [-2.08] [-2.28] [-2.26] [-1.58] 
PB -0.1571* -0.1580* 0.5928** 0.5222** 
 [-1.94] [-1.93] [2.88] [2.84] 
ROA 0.0220 0.0216 -0.2566 -0.0548 
 [0.06] [0.06] [-0.94] [-0.19] 
     
Observations 2,115 2,115 184 184 




Table 7. Target price manipulation direction, deal withdrawal, and premium 
 
This table shows the results of the regression analysis where the main dependent variable is 
WITHDRAWN in Models 1 and 2, and PREMIUM in Models 3 and 4. The sample consists of 
mergers and acquisitions announced between 2003 and 2014 in which the acquirer was seeking 
to buy more than 50% of the target. EODPD_N is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the 
negative dislocation of EOD prices is detected over thirty days before the announcement date, 
and 0 otherwise. EODPD_P is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the positive dislocation of 
EOD prices is detected over thirty days before the announcement date, and 0 otherwise. All 
regressions include constant, country, year, and Fama-French industry dummies. PREMIUM, 
LEVERAGE, PB, and ROA are winsorized at the 99% level. ***, **, and * represent 1%, 5%, 
and 10% significance levels, respectively. Marginal effects are reported. Standard errors are 












EODPD_N 0.0980**  -7.7621***  
 [2.32]  [-2.93]  
EODPD _P  0.1338***  -9.6839*** 
  [4.65]  [-4.80] 
INDUSTRY -0.0277*** -0.0275*** 2.0713*** 2.1404*** 
 [-3.29] [-3.56] [3.62] [3.50] 
TOEHOLD 0.0008* 0.0008 -0.1100* -0.1051 
 [1.73] [1.56] [-1.81] [-1.66] 
STOCK 0.0589*** 0.0635*** -5.4801*** -5.5940*** 
 [3.62] [3.32] [-3.93] [-4.11] 
CASH -0.0129 -0.0103 2.0018*** 1.9329*** 
 [-0.94] [-0.67] [3.91] [3.57] 
HOSTILE 0.4283*** 0.4176*** 5.0290 5.0553 
 [3.21] [3.18] [1.33] [1.31] 
PUBLICBIDDER -0.0510*** -0.0464*** 2.2956** 2.0716** 
 [-3.73] [-3.15] [2.41] [2.10] 
CROSS-COUNTRY 0.0058 0.0079 1.3225 1.3476 
 [0.35] [0.46] [1.44] [1.54] 
LEVERAGE 0.0005 0.0006 -0.0407* -0.0459** 
 [1.20] [1.31] [-1.94] [-2.16] 
PB -0.0045*** -0.0048*** -0.1760** -0.1586* 
 [-3.25] [-3.22] [-2.23] [-2.01] 
ROA 0.0023 0.0023 0.0037 -0.0023 
 [0.54] [0.55] [0.01] [-0.01] 
     
Observations 2,693 2,693 2,115 2,115 




Table 8. Acquirer price manipulation and deal withdrawal 
This table shows the results of the regression analysis where the main dependent variable is 
WITHDRAWN. The sample consists of mergers and acquisitions announced between 2003 
and 2014 in which the acquirer was seeking to buy more than 50% of the target. In Model 1, 
we eliminate the deals where the information on EODPD for the acquirer price was missing. 
In Model 2, we use a matched sample. In Models 2-5, we include only deals where the 
percentage of stock as the method of payment was higher than zero. In this table, EODPD is 
an indicator variable that equals 1 if the dislocation of the acquirer’s EOD price is detected 
over thirty days before the M&A announcement date, and 0 otherwise. EODPD_N is an 
indicator variable that equals 1 if the negative dislocation of the acquirer’s EOD price is 
detected over thirty days before the announcement date, and 0 otherwise. EODPD_P is an 
indicator variable that equals 1 if the positive dislocation of the acquirer’s EOD price is 
detected over thirty days before the announcement date, and 0 otherwise. All regressions 
include constant, country, year, and Fama-French industry dummies. LEVERAGE, PB, and 
ROA are winsorized at the 99% level. ***, **, and * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% significance 
levels, respectively. Marginal effects are reported. Standard errors are clustered by country. All 
variables are defined in the appendix. 
 
   (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) 
EODPD -0.0157 -0.0033 0.0637   
 [-0.65] [-1.09] [0.50]   
EODPD_P    0.2557**  
    [2.37]  
EODPD _N     -0.0508 
     [-0.49] 
INDUSTRY -0.0225** -0.0409** -0.0384*** -0.0380*** -0.0394*** 
 [-2.10] [-2.33] [-2.65] [-2.71] [-2.61] 
TOEHOLD 0.0005  0.0012 0.0013 0.0012 
 [0.90]  [0.57] [0.64] [0.60] 
STOCK 0.0528*** 0.6572***    
 [2.95] [7.10]    
CASH -0.0131 0.0046    
 [-0.55] [0.49]    
HOSTILE 0.4948*** 0.9545*** 0.7629*** 0.7672*** 0.7909*** 
 [5.54] [78.39] [6.34] [6.22] [8.11] 
PUBLICBID
DER -0.0614*** -0.0322*** -0.0062 -0.0105 -0.0052 
 [-4.18] [-7.31] [-0.13] [-0.22] [-0.11] 
CROSS-
COUNTRY -0.0027 0.0803*** 0.0135 0.0122 0.0113 
 [-0.19] 0.0031 [0.39] [0.32] [0.35] 
LEVERAGE 0.0004 [1.38] 0.0018 0.0016 0.0015 
 [1.40] -0.0005 [0.37] [0.32] [0.32] 
PB -0.0028 [-1.05] -0.0045 -0.0043 -0.0043 
 [-0.98] 0.0057 [-1.13] [-1.12] [-1.10] 
ROA 0.0033 [1.42] 0.0190 0.0193 0.0189 
 [0.53] 0.0031 [1.11] [1.13] [1.16] 
 -0.0225** [1.38] -0.0384*** -0.0380*** -0.0394*** 
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Observations 1,571 100 614 614 614 
Pseudo R-
squared 





Table 9. Target price manipulation, regulation, and deal withdrawal 
 
This table shows the main results of the regression analysis where the main dependent variable 
is WITHDRAWN. The sample consists of all mergers and acquisitions announced between 
2003 and 2014 in which the acquirer was seeking to acquire more than 50% of the target. All 
regressions include constant, controls, country, year, and Fama-French industry dummies. In 
Model 1, interaction with MMI (Market Manipulation Index) is included. In Model 2, 
interaction with ITI (Insider Trading Index) is included. In Model 3, interaction with BAI 
(Broker Agency Index) is included. All variables are defined in appendix 1. LEVERAGE, PB, 
and ROA are winsorized at the 99% level. ***, **, and * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% 
significance levels, respectively. Marginal effects are reported. Standard errors are clustered 
by country. All variables are defined in the appendix. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
EODPD 0.2654* 0.2015*** 0.1637*** 
 [1.85] [4.19] [3.66] 
EODPD_MMI -0.0068   
 [-1.30]   
MMI -0.0314***   
 [-7.66]   
EODPD_ITI  -0.0093***  
  [-3.74]  
ITI  -0.0766***  
  [-7.73]  
EODPD_BAI   -0.0136** 
   [-2.26] 
BAI   0.0243** 
   [2.24] 
    
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,435 2,435 2,435 





Table 10. Target price manipulation and deal premium 
This table shows the results of the regression analysis where the main dependent variable is 
PREMIUM. The sample consists of all mergers and acquisitions announced between 2003 and 
2014 in which the acquirer was seeking to acquire more than 50% of the target. All regressions 
include constant, controls, country, year, and Fama-French industry dummies. In Model 1, 
interaction with MMI (Market Manipulation Index) is included. In Model 2, interaction with 
ITI (Insider Trading Index) is included. In Model 3, interaction with BAI (Broker Agency 
Index) is included. LEVERAGE, PB, and ROA are winsorized at the 99% level. ***, **, and 
* represent 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively. Marginal effects are reported. 
Standard errors are clustered by country. All variables are defined in the appendix. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
EODPD -16.3592*** -12.7580*** -12.4432*** 
 [-4.39] [-6.27] [-8.40] 
EODPD_MMI 0.6128*   
 [1.87]   
MMI 0.2807   
 [0.77]   
EODPD_ITI  0.5115**  
  [1.99]  
ITI  0.3650  
  [0.77]  
EODPD_BAI   1.0290** 
   [2.57] 
BAI   0.6547 
   [0.77] 
    
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,919 1,919 1,919 






Table A1. Variable descriptions 
Name Description [Source] 
  
Dependent Variables  
  
WITHDRAWN An indicator variable that equals 1 if the deal is withdrawn, and 0 
otherwise [Thomson One SDC]. 
PREMIUM The premium of the offer price to the share price four weeks before 





EODPD An indicator variable that equals 1 if the dislocation of the target’s 
EOD price is detected over thirty days before the M&A 
announcement date, and 0 otherwise. CMCRC surveillance staff 
constructed the dislocation of EOD price cases by examining the 
price change between the last trade price (Pt) and the last available 
trade price fifteen minutes before the continuous trading period 
ends (Pt-15). For securities exchanges that have closing auctions, 
the close price at auction is used (Pauction). A price movement is 
dislocated if it is four standard deviations away from the mean 
price change during the past 100-trading day benchmarking 
period, and if it reverts back to the mean level the next morning. 
To be considered as dislocation of EOD price case, the price 
movement between the last trade price (Pt) and the next day 
opening price (Pt+1), and between the last trade price (Pt) and the 
last available trade price fifteen minutes before the continuous 
trading period ends (Pt-15), must be larger than 50% (Pauction or 
Pt - Pt+1)/(Pauction or Pt - Pt-15) ≥50% [Capital Markets 
Cooperative Research Centre (CMCRC)]. 
EODPD_T Average trading value as a percentage of the daily trading volume 
surrounding each suspected dislocating EOD price case 
(CMCRC). 
  
Deal Characteristics  
  
COMPETING An indicator variable that equals 1 if there is a competing bidder, 
and 0 otherwise [Thomson One SDC. 
INDUSTRY An indicator variable that equals 1 if the target firm and acquirer 
firm are in the same industry (two-digit SIC), and 0 otherwise 
[Thomson One SDC]. 
TOEHOLD The percentage of the target’s common shares held by the acquirer 
on the acquisition announcement date [Thomson One SDC]. 
STOCK An indicator variable that equals 1 if the consideration for the 
acquisition consists in 100% of the acquiring firm’s stock, and 0 
otherwise [Thomson One SDC]. 
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CASH An indicator variable that equals 1 if the consideration for the 
acquisition consists of only cash, and 0 otherwise [Thomson One 
SDC]. 
HOSTILE An indicator variable that equals 1 if the deal is reported as hostile, 
and 0 otherwise [Thomson One SDC]. 
PUBLICBIDDER An indicator variable that equals 1 if the acquiring firm is a 
publicly traded company, and 0 otherwise [Thomson One SDC]. 
CROSS-COUNTRY An indicator variable that equals 1 if the acquiring firm is from a 
different country than the target firm, and 0 otherwise [Thomson 
One SDC]. 
  
Target Characteristics  
  
LEVERAGE Ratio of target’s long-term debt to book value of common equity 
[Thomson Reuters]. 
PB Ratio of target’s market value to book value of common equity 
[Thomson Reuters]. 







MMI Market Manipulation Index. Sum of Price Manipulation Rules 
Index, Volume Manipulation Rules Index, Spoofing Rules Index, 
and False Disclosure Rules Index [Cumming, Johan, and Li, 
2011]. 
ITI Insider Trading Index. Sum of dummy variables for front-running, 
client precedence, trading ahead of research reports, separation of 
research and trading, broker ownership limit, restrictions on 
affiliation, restrictions on communications, investment company 
securities, influencing or rewarding the employees of others, and 
anti-intimidation/coordination [Cumming, Johan, and Li, 2011]. 
BAI Broker Agency Index. Sum of dummy variables for trade through, 
improper execution, restrictions on member use of exchange 
name, restrictions on sales materials and telemarketing, and fair 






Table A2. Summary statistics 
 (1) (2) 
 Withdrawn Deals Completed Deals 
 Mean SD Min Median Max Mean SD Min Median Max 
EODPD [-30;0] 0.1173 0.3223 0 0 1 0.0400 0.1960 0 0 1 
EODPD [-20;0] 0.0833 0.2768 0 0 1 0.0264 0.1603 0 0 1 
EODPD [-10;0] 0.0432 0.2036 0 0 1 0.0136 0.1159 0 0 1 
EODPD_T [-30;0] 0.0159 0.0849 0 0 0.8744 0.0037 0.0394 0 0 1 
EODPD_T [-20;0] 0.0136 0.0826 0 0 0.8744 0.0026 0.0315 0 0 0.7894 
EODPD_T [-10;0] 0.0085 0.0703 0 0 0.8744 0.0009 0.0161 0 0 0.5671 
EODPD_N 0.0556 0.2294 0 0 1 0.0202 0.1407 0 0 1 
EODPD_P 0.0617 0.2410 0 0 1 0.0198 0.1393 0 0 1 
Controls           
PREMIUM 34.63 47.37 -58.71 25.44 261.54 39.73 43.04 -58.71 31.39 261.54 
INDUSTRY 0.4167 0.4938 0 0 1 0.5130 0.4999 0 1 1 
TOEHOLD 3.9717 9.7775 0 0 48.1400 1.8701 6.9832 0 0 49.7900 
STOCK 0.1883 0.3915 0 0 1 0.1295 0.3358 0 0 1 
CASH 0.5926 0.4921 0 1 1 0.6256 0.4841 0 1 1 
HOSTILE 0.0741 0.2623 0 0 1 0.0082 0.0905 0 0 1 
PUBLICBIDDER 0.5370 0.4994 0 1 1 0.6219 0.4850 0 1 1 
CROSS-COUNTRY 0.2469 0.4319    0.2384 0.4262    
LEVERAGE 7.9955 34.6653 -2.2094 0.1246 343.3330 3.3803 22.4781 -2.2094 0.0632 343.3330 
PB 1.5207 2.5825 -9.3040 1.3386 12.3626 1.8798 2.7910 -9.3040 1.4066 15.1864 
ROA 0.6921 2.4343 -11.9270 0.3386 16.6560 0.5131 1.7404 -19.9690 0.4624 16.6560 
 
